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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a comparable set of results on the monetary transmission channels on firm 
investment (the interest rate channel and the broad credit channel) for the four largest euro-area 
countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain), using particularly rich micro datasets for each 
country containing over 215,000 observations from 1985 to 1999. For each of those countries, 
investment relationships are estimated explaining investment by its user cost, sales and cash flow. 
A first result is that investment is sensitive to user cost changes in all those four countries. This 
implies an operative interest channel in these euro-area countries. A second result is that investment 
in all countries is quite sensitive to cash flow movements. However, only in Italy do smaller firms 
react more to cash flow movements than large firms, implying that a broad credit channel might not 
be equally pervasive in all countries. 
 
JEL Classification numbers: E22, E50 
Keywords: Investment, Monetary Transmission Channels, User Cost of Capital 
 
Résumé 
 
Cet article présente un ensemble de résultats comparables sur les canaux de transmission de la 
politique monétaire via l’investissement des entreprises (canal du taux d’intérêt et canal large du 
crédit) pour les quatre pays les plus grands de la zone Euro (l’Allemagne, l’Espagne, la France et 
l’Italie) en utilisant des bases de données particulièrement riches pour chaque pays, contenant plus 
de 215 000 bilans d’entreprises de 1985 à 1999. Pour chacun de ces pays, une fonction 
d’investissement est estimée où l’investissement est expliqué par le coût du capital, les ventes et 
l’autofinancement. Une premier résultat est que l’investissement dépend effectivement du coût du 
capital dans ces quatre pays. Ceci montre que le canal du taux d’intérêt via l’investissement a des 
effets non négligeables dans ces pays de la zone Euro. Un second résultat est que l’investissement 
dépend de l’autofinancement dans ces quatre pays. Cependant, c’est uniquement en Italie que 
l’investissement des entreprises de petite taille dépend plus fortement de l’autofinancement par 
rapport à l’investissement des autres entreprises. Ceci suggère que le canal large du crédit n’a pas 
nécessairement la même vigueur dans ces quatre pays. 
 
Mots clés : Investissement, canaux de transmission de la politique monétaire, coût du capital. 
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 I. Introduction 
 
Monetary policy is generally thought to be able to affect business investment 
through multiple channels. First, a traditional interest-rate channel is identified, whereby 
changes in market interest rates imply changes in the cost of capital, which in turn affect 
investment. However, the difficulties of using aggregate data to find clear evidence of this 
channel are well known. Second, changes in market interest rates affect the net cash flow 
(i.e. cash flow after interest payments) available to a firm. Given imperfect capital 
markets, the availability of net cash flow will have an effect on investment. This is 
generally referred to as the “broad credit channel”. 
 This paper provides an investigation of those two channels based on results from a 
unique comparative study of the four largest euro-area countries.2 Using rich firm 
databases for each country, standardised regressions were run to make comparison across 
countries feasible. Although, for confidentiality reasons, individual data could not be 
pooled – making formal statistical testing impossible – the standardisation of the analysis 
should still allow asymmetries in the working of the above channels to be detected. In 
particular, reliance on firm data should make it possible to identify whether there are 
differences in the behaviour of firms with otherwise similar characteristics. This has a 
distinct advantage over the inference based on aggregate data in which “true” differences 
in behaviour are potentially confounded by differences due to composition of the firms in 
the aggregate. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we motivate the analysis 
and spell out the relevant questions that can be answered by comparing the results across 
countries. In section 3 we describe the theoretical framework. In section 4 we present our 
data. In section 5 we present the regression results. In section 6 we test whether a broad 
credit channel is operative in the euro area. In section 7 we investigate the link between 
monetary policy, user cost and cash flow.  
 
II. Motivation of the analysis  
 
Since the beginning of monetary union in Europe, a large body of empirical 
analysis has been devoted to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. These 
                                                          
2 Mojon, Smets and Vermeulen (2001) investigate the elasticity of investment with respect to its 
user cost using industry data on the same four countries. The MTN project has led to a number of 
complementary companion papers on investment and monetary policy: Butzen, Fuss and Vermeu-
len (2001), Chatelain and Tiomo (2001), Gaiotti and Generale (2001), von Kalckreuth (2001), Lűn-
neman and Mathä (2001) and Valderrama (2001).  
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analyses are usually justified by the observation that a common monetary policy affects 
economies characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity.  
This paper is a contribution to the discussion of monetary policy transmission in 
the euro area; it focuses on the four major euro-area countries by using data collected at 
the national level. Our perspective is at once wider and narrower than the one motivating 
previous research. It is narrower in that we limit our attention to a specific channel of 
monetary policy, firms’ investment spending. It is wider in that, by using micro data, we 
try to take into account the relevance of firms’ balance-sheet conditions in the transmis-
sion of monetary policy. The contribution of the paper consists mainly in an assessment of 
the main determinants of investment spending in each of the countries. 
Interest in the transmission mechanism is motivated by a variety of reasons that 
also can have policy implications. First, for a careful assessment of the monetary stance in 
the area, it is important to know if the pure interest channel is the only channel at work. If 
agents’ financial conditions are shown to be important, then knowing these conditions 
proves to be important for the policy maker; at the same time this knowledge helps to 
better forecast the likely effects of a monetary policy decision.  
As it is well known, the main channels of monetary policy transmission have been 
thoroughly examined mainly using macro information (see the survey in Guiso, Kashyap, 
Panetta and Terlizzese, 1999). These kind of analyses have, on the one hand enabled 
regularities and differences across the countries of the euro area to be uncovered; on the 
other hand, they have proved to be limited in many respects. First of all, it is known that 
aggregation can blur the differences in the transmission of monetary policy and impede 
the identification of important parts of the transmission mechanism. Hence, recourse to 
micro data is often motivated in the literature by the recognition of the limits of aggregate 
studies. In their U.S. study on the relationship between investment spending and the user 
cost of capital, Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999) motivate the use of micro data by the 
very fact that studies at the aggregate level often fail to find an economically significant 
relationship between these two variables. As the authors note, this failure could have been 
due “to biased estimates due to problems of simultaneity, capital market frictions, or firm 
heterogeneity that may be better addressed with micro data”. 
Moreover, micro data are also needed because of the “extensive variation [in 
micro data that] will likely provide better instruments [for instrumental variable 
estimation] than can be obtained at the aggregate level.” The motivation for employing 
micro data can be generally ascribed to the advantages of panel data estimation versus 
time series estimation, that is to use “information on both the intertemporal dynamics and 
the individuality of entities being investigated” (Hsiao, 1995). Moreover, in our analysis 
on the determinants of investment, the use of micro data allows firm-level measures of the 
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user cost, sales and cash flow, thus taking into account the fact that the transmission of 
monetary impulses occurs at the firm level.  
In fact, as is well known and indeed very well explained by Chirinko, Fazzari and 
Meyer (1999), one of the difficulties found in the empirical analysis of the relationship 
between investment and the user cost is that these estimates usually turn out to be very 
low. They report that this may be due to simultaneity bias, arguing that “investment 
comprises a volatile component of aggregate demand, positively correlated with the 
business cycle, and business cycle movements correlate with interest rates. Positive 
investment shocks, for example, can cause positive movements in output and the demand 
for credit that affect the required rates of return on debt and equity. Conventional wisdom 
suggests that simultaneity between investment shocks and interest rates biases the user 
cost elasticity towards zero.” In this respect, the cross-sectional variation coming from the 
tax component in the user cost variable that we use in the estimation can be regarded as an 
exogenous source of variation, thus allowing us to identify the effects of the cost of capital 
on investment. Moreover, simultaneity problems are reduced by IV or GMM estimation. 
Hence, the combination of instrumental variable estimation and the exogenous source of 
variability ensured by tax variations should improve our ability to properly identify user 
cost effects.3  
Finally, micro data permit us to uncover the existence of a broad credit channel, 
i.e. the second channel of monetary transmission.  
The literature on the broad credit channel of monetary policy has emphasised the 
relevance of information asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy. In particu-
lar, the difficulty faced by lenders in monitoring the projects of “opaque” firms implies 
that firms’ financial conditions are important for the availability and cost of external 
finance. The result that, given information asymmetries, the Modigliani-Miller theorem 
does not hold implies also that firms that are likely to be more exposed to problems of 
asymmetric information might react more to a monetary tightening (Gilchrist and 
Zakrajsek, 1995). Analysing the reaction to a common shock of groups of firms 
characterised by weaker balance sheets and comparing it to other firms that are in a better 
financial position solves the identification problems encountered with the use of macro-
data. 
There are also drawbacks in using micro data. They mainly consist in the 
difficulty of recovering aggregate effects from micro estimations. This is mainly 
caused by the fact that usually shorter time periods are available in panels, thus 
                                                          
3 It has to be clarified that we are not pursuing the strategy of research adopted by Cummins et al. 
(1994, 1996) that stretched this line of identification as far as to measure investment elasticities to 
the user cost in years of major tax reform. At any rate, it is important for us to be sure of having a 
sufficient amount of variability in the data due to this tax component.  
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implying that variation in the monetary policy stance can be more limited than 
with time series data, and that samples are often biased towards specific types of 
firms. We are aware of these difficulties: as documented in the data set description, 
we are confident that the sample chosen is quite representative of the firms’ 
characteristics in each country; moreover, in comparison to other contributions on 
panel analysis, we have panels that are quite long. A high degree of heterogeneity 
seems to characterise these economies, in particular with regard to firms’ financial 
structure, the availability of external funds and the industrial structure. Table 1a 
illustrates some of these differences. 
On the real side, the distribution of firms by size turns out to be quite dissimilar: 
in Germany only 48 per cent of total turnover of non-financial firms pertained to firms 
with less than 250 employees, whereas, at the other extreme, in Italy such firms accounted 
for 71 per cent. 
As to financial structure, firms differ markedly with respect to both the 
availability of external funds and the composition of their financial debt. Table 1a shows 
that reliance on bank credit is highest in Italy, partly reflecting the more limited role of 
equity in firm financing; it is much more limited in the other countries. Spain, a country in 
an intermediate position as to dependence on bank debt, also shows a high share of equity 
financing, in terms of both capital’s and reserves’ share of firms’ total liabilities and of 
stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP. More importantly, for the 
transmission of monetary policy impulses, the share of short-term debt differs markedly 
across countries, with higher values in Italy and Spain. Looking at recent transaction data, 
flows in bank loans have substantially exceeded flows in shares and other equity in 
Germany, Italy and Spain. France is the exception to this pattern. It seems to be the 
country with a lower dependence on bank debt, corroborated by its relatively high stock 
market capitalisation.  
One obvious question that arises when looking at cross-country differences, then, 
is whether these broad institutional characteristics are conducive to a different reaction to 
monetary policy. It needs to be clarified that the research strategy adopted in this paper is 
able to address only partially the issue of asymmetries across countries. We are in fact 
mainly interested in documenting the importance of the different transmission 
mechanisms in each country. Our research strategy is the following: we first estimate 
investment equations for each country, giving us the sensitivity of investment to its main 
determinants: the user cost, sales and cash flow. This permits an assessment of the relative 
importance of the different channels in each country. Moreover, by calculating the 
response of investment determinants to monetary policy we obtain a measure of the 
elasticity of investment to monetary policy. The comparison of the results obtained across 
 5
countries is needed to understand how the transmission of monetary impulses takes place 
at the country level. Moreover, it gives a rough indication of the existence or absence of 
asymmetries. For confidentiality reasons, cross-country comparisons cannot are not 
performed on a pooled data set, thus impeding a formal test on the significance of the 
differences. 
We believe, though, that examining the main channels of transmission in each 
country is only a first step in assessing the relevance of asymmetries. Consider the case of 
the broad credit channel: if financial variables prove to be important in a given country, 
then there is evidence that differences in access to financial markets in this country play a 
role. But, at the country-by-country analysis stage, finding larger effects of financial 
variables in one country does not mean that a broad credit channel is at work. One way to 
partly address this issue consists in performing a test of the differences in reaction to 
investment determinants for firms that are more likely to be subject to information 
asymmetries. The detection of significant differences within each country permits us to 
highlight how widespread heterogeneous behaviour is in the countries we examine. Future 
research in the field should seek to carefully assess the quantitative importance of the 
eventual differences found and try to trace the observed differences back to the presence 
of heterogeneity in behaviour or in the composition of the firms in the economy. 
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Table 1a: Financial structure, capital markets and real indicators in the euro area 
 Germany France Italy  Spain 
Financial structure of manufacturing firms (1) 
as a  per cent of total liabilities; 1997 
Bank credit 6.2 7.2 21.2 11.0 
Of which:     
Maturity of less than 1 year 3.7 3.3 14.3 6.6 
Maturity of more than 1 year  2.5 3.9 6.9 4.4 
Bonds 0.2 1.9 0.9 0.1 
Capital and reserves 32.9 38.0 28.1 45.7 
External financing transactions of non-financial corporations (2) 
as a  per cent of nominal GDP; Average 1996-1999 
Loans 4.5 2.0 2.0 5.4 
Securities other than shares -0.1 0.6 0.0 -0.1 
Shares and other equity 1.5 3.4 1.3 2.7 
Other liabilities 0.8 0.7 1.2 6.3 
Capital markets (2) 
As a  per cent of nominal GDP; 1997 
Total financial liabilities of non-financial 
firms 
 
128.8 
 
268.4 
 
135.0 
 
209.6 
Stock-market capitalisation 39.9 49.5 30.6 56.2 
Bonds of non-financial firms 0.1 . 1.6 2.7 
Real indicators  
Investment/GDP  per cent average 1996-
2000 (3) 
22.2 19.0 19.4 23.3 
Share of total non-financial firms turnover 
attributable to firms with less than 250 
employees 1997 (2) 
48.0 56.0 71.0 62.0 
(1) Source: BACH data set (European Commission). 
(2) Source: Eurostat. 
(3) Source: OECD and Eurostat. 
 
III. The theoretical framework 
 
The investment model we use is derived from the neo-classical demand for capital. It 
has recently been estimated using panel data by, among others, Bond, Elston, Mairesse 
and Mulkay (1997), Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999), and Mairesse, Hall and Mulkay 
(1999, 2001). Abstracting from irreversibility, uncertainty, delivery lags and adjustment 
costs, the first order condition for a firm’s optimisation problem leads to the equality be-
tween the marginal product of capital and the user cost of capital UC : it
 ( ) itititK UCLKF =, ,         (1) 
 
where i stands for firm, and t stands for time.  
Following Auerbach (1983) and Hayashi (2000), we obtain a weighted-average 
definition of the user cost of capital where the cost of debt and equity are weighted with 
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their respective share of the total liabilities of the firm. We use the accounting proportions 
of debt and equity which affects taxation: 
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where s is the sector-specific index,  the price of final goods,  the price of capital 
goods of sector s; 
stp
I
stp
tτ  the corporate income tax rate, against which interest payments and 
depreciation are assumed to be deductible, z the present value of depreciation allowances, 
and itc the investment tax credit. AI is the apparent interest rate, measured as interest 
payment over gross debt, LD the long-term debt rate used as a proxy for the opportunity 
cost of equity, E the book value of equity, and sδ  the industry-specific rate of economic 
depreciation.  
In contrast to the King and Fullerton (1984) approach, as used by Harhoff and 
Ramb (2001) and von Kalckreuth (2001), this user cost of capital does not take into 
account the differences for dividends and retained earnings for households income tax and 
the distinction between different capital goods for the computation of the net present value 
of depreciation allowances.4 
Following Eisner and Nadiri (1968), we parameterise the production function by a 
constant elasticity of the substitution production function: 
 
( ) νσσσσσσ αβ 111, −−−  += itiititiitit KLATFPLKF ,  1=+ ii βα ,  (3) 
 
where  is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, σ ν  represents returns 
to scale,  is total factor productivity which we assume to have two components: a 
firm-specific one and a year-specific one. Substituting the marginal productivity of capital 
in equation (1) yields: 
ti ATFP
itititit HUCYK loglogloglog +−= σθ ,     (4) 
where  νσ−+σ=θ 1  and ( )σνσ να itit ATFPH ⋅= −1)(  .   (5) 
itY  represents sales. The variable  depends on the time-varying term  and 
the firm-specific termTFP . The elasticity of capital to sales is unity (
itH tA
i 1=θ ), if the pro-
duction function has constant returns to scale ( 1=ν ), or if its elasticity of substitution is 
unity (σ ), that is, in the Cobb-Douglas case.  1=
                                                          
4 The user cost variable in von Kalckreuth (2001) models additional details of the German tax code. 
However, results in that paper are qualitatively similar to the results presented here.  
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We do not assume that (4) always holds; instead, we assume that the firm changes 
its capital stock in the direction of a long-run target value K*: 
 
itititit HUCYK loglogloglog
* +−= σθ ,     (6) 
 
The long-run target value for capital, K*, is not observable, which means that to 
go from (6) to an empirical specification, we need to specify an adjustment process. We 
specify an auto-regressive distributed lag model (ADL(3,3). 5): 
 
3322110332211
03322110332211
−−−−−−
−−−−−− ++++−− −−++++++= ititititititit ititititititititit hhhhucucuc ucyyyykkkk φφφφσσσ σθθθθωωω  (7)  
 
where we have used lower case letters to refer to the corresponding level variables in logs. 
In the long run, the effects of a permanent change in the explanatory variables in (7) are 
assumed to add up to the effect given by (6). This implies that we can identify the long-
run elasticities of sales and user cost. The long-run user cost elasticity with respect to the 
stock of capital is given by )1/()( 3213210 ωωωσσσσσ −−−+++=
)321
 and the long-
run sales elasticity with respect to the stock of capital is 
1/()( 3210 ωωωθθθθθ −−−+++= . Some caution has to be taken in 
interpreting these long run coefficients. The ADL is a reduced form of some underlying 
unknown structural model of adjustment of the capital stock. As such the long-run 
coefficients can contain both expectational and technology parameters. At this stage, there 
are two possible strategies. The first one transforms the ADL model into an error-
correction model (Hall, Mairesse and Mulkay, 1999). The second strategy consists of first 
differencing the ADL model (Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer, 1999). The possibility of firm-
specific effects not only on the level of productivity but also on its growth rate may justify 
this second strategy on panel data. For simplicity, we will only use the second strategy. 
We leave the possible comparison between the two approaches to companion country 
papers of the Monetary Transmission Network. First-differencing and using the 
approximation δ−=− loglog tK −− 11 / ttt KIK , and replacing productivity by time 
dummies, a firm-specific effect f and a random term ε yields: 
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5 Hall, Mairesse and Mulkay (1999) consider an ADL(2,2) but do not include the user cost of capi-
tal.  
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 We estimate this equation (8). In addition, to be in line with the literature, we also 
estimate an extension of equation (8). It has been argued frequently that a measure of 
liquidity should enter the model to account for access to internal funds that might affect 
investment in the presence of financing constraints. Liquidity is usually measured as cash 
flow (CF). For comparison with the existing literature, and to avoid unit problems, cash 
flow enters relative to the existing capital stock. 
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The parameters φ  measure the sensitivity of investment with respect to cash flow 
movements.  
 
IV. Data set description  
 
In this section an overview is given of the individual country data used in the 
regressions. Definitions of the variables used were made as comparable as possible 
between the different countries. National data sets do differ in many respects. First of all, 
the way in which data are collected in each country is not the same. The fact that the 
prerequisites for entering in the sample are different implies that the representativeness of 
each sample differs across countries. In general, the samples are skewed towards larger 
firms. Moreover, every sample is unbalanced and differs in the degree in which firms 
enter and leave the sample. 
In Germany, the Bundesbank's corporate balance sheet database constitutes the 
largest collection of accounting data for German non-financial firms;6 the collection of 
financial statements originated from the Bundesbank's function of performing credit 
assessments within the scope of its rediscount operations. On the whole, every year 
around 70,000 annual accounts were collected, on a strictly confidential basis, by the 
Bundesbank's branch offices. The German data set is probably skewed towards large firms 
since, according to the turnover tax statistics, these firms represented roughly 75 per cent 
                                                          
6 A detailed description is contained in Deutsche Bundesbank (1998); see also Friderichs and Sauvé 
(1999) and Stöss (2001). 
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of the total turnover of the West German manufacturing sector, albeit only 8 per cent of 
the total number of firms. 
In France, the data source consists of compulsory accounting tax forms7 and of 
additional information taken from surveys collected by the Banque de France (the 
database “Centrale des Bilans”'). Since these data are collected only from firms who are 
willing to provide them, French data are likewise skewed towards large firms.8  
Data for Italy are drawn from the Italian Company Accounts Data Service 
(Centrale dei bilanci), that, considering the whole period 1983-1999 and all non-financial 
enterprises, contains around 692,000 observations, for around 40,000 firms per year. Also 
for Italy there exists a bias towards large firms, since firms are not randomly drawn: in 
fact, the prerequisite for entering the sample is that each firm has to be indebted with a 
bank; moreover, preference is given to firms with multiple lending relationships.9  
The Spanish data were obtained from the Central Balance Sheet Office of the 
Banco de España (CBBE), and, in particular, from the Annual Central Balance Sheet Da-
tabase (CBA); this database is compiled through the voluntary collaboration of non-finan-
cial firms and is edited by means of contacts with them. Thus, it only covers those firms 
that voluntarily complete the questionnaire and is biased towards large and manufacturing 
firms. The initial database included 115,980 observations corresponding to 22,014 firms 
over the 1983-1999 period. In 1994, its coverage of the non-financial firms sector, in 
terms of value added, was around 35  per cent.10  
For the econometric analysis, a smaller data set was used in each country. The 
loss in observations was due to the following reasons. First, we limited the analysis to the 
manufacturing sector.11 Second, applying the perpetual inventory formula and using 
investment over lagged capital as a regressor meant dropping the first year-firm 
observations. Third, trimming and selecting firms which are consecutively present in the 
sample at least during five years in order to use a sufficient number of lags as explanatory 
variables led to the final sample in each country.12 
                                                          
7 They are collected by the Banque de France in the database FIBEN. 
8 Small firms of less than 20 employees are underrepresented. No statistical sampling procedure has 
been used to correct this bias. 
9 Moreover, since the information collected is meant to be a service for banks in deciding their 
credit policies, the sample is biased towards firms that are creditworthy. 
10 For a more detailed description of this database, see Banco de España (2000). 
11 The calculation of the capital stock at replacement cost presumably is more reliable for the 
manufacturing sector. 
12 Some specificities in each country are worth mentioning: for the German sample, which 
originally contained unincorporated businesses, we have excluded sole proprietorships and 
unincorporated partnerships because of differences in accounting rules; All publicly-owned 
enterprises were discarded, too, as they might not be profit-oriented. Again for reasons of 
comparability, we only consider West German manufacturing firms, and we confine ourselves to 
the years 1988 - 1997. Earlier years are affected by the radical regulatory changes in accounting 
introduced in 1985, triggered by an EU directive on the harmonisation of financial statements. In 
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In general, we ended up with samples that, though skewed towards larger firms, 
are still representative of the manufacturing sector of each economy. Their coverage, 
calculated on the total number of employees in the manufacturing sector, ranges from 19 
per cent for Spain to somewhat less than 45 per cent for Germany. The corresponding 
figures for France and Italy are 27 per cent and 21 per cent, respectively. Moreover, very 
often, balance sheet data only contain large and listed firms, whereas in our sample the 
median number of employees is 118 in Germany, 31 in Italy, 50 in Spain, and 55 in 
France. This means also that the data set covers unlisted companies, which are probably 
the best candidates to test for balance-sheet effects, quite well; listed companies represent 
less than 4 per cent of the sample in Spain, less than 2 in Italy, and less than 6 in Germany 
and France. Moreover, firms are spread throughout the sectors of manufacturing13. 
In each country, the period covered by the samples used in estimation is 1985-
1999, with the exception of Germany for which the time period available for estimation is 
1988-1997. The total number of observations and the number of years available are 
comparable to or higher than those of the sample used by Chirinko et al. (1999) for US 
firms.14 For the European samples, coverage, calculated on the total number of employees 
in the manufacturing sector, ranges from 19 per cent for Spain to 45 per cent for Germany. 
Table 1b shows the investment-capital ratio, real sales growth, real user cost 
growth, cash flow on capital, and log of the user cost level in each country. Overall, as is 
usually the case with panel data, there is a wide dispersion of the variables used in all 
countries. The mean of the investment capital ratio is higher in Germany (0.181) and 
Spain (0.186) than in France (0.122) and Italy (0.124). The high mean of the investment 
capital ratio in Spain is matched by a high average sales growth (0.043). This contrasts 
with Germany where average sales growth is the lowest of all four countries (0.021). 
Average user cost growth over the period differs quite substantially across the four 
countries. In Germany user costs increased on average by 2.5 percent, while in Italy they 
decreased on average by 1.2 percent. On average, the ratio of cash flow over capital is 
higher in Spain (0.37) and France (0.33) than in Germany (0.276) and Italy (0.196). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
Italy, we discarded the firms for which information to construct the user cost (i.e. fiscal data) was 
not available. 
13 The wider time dimension of these databases makes them preferable to other data sets containing 
a larger number of firms, which are often available in the countries examined. For example, in Italy 
the CERVED database contains information on balance sheet and profit and loss accounts of all 
firms excluding sole proprietorships (roughly 500,000 firms), but the first year available is 1993. 
14 They had a sample of 26,071 observations ranging from 1981 to 1991 with a total number of 
firms of 4,095. 
 12
 Table 1b: Summary statistics: complete cleaned data sets 
Var Country Mean Std. Dev. Minimum 25 per cent Median 75 per cent Maximum
It/Kt-1    
 Germany 0.181 0.219 0.000 0.059 0.116 0.216 2.291
 France 0.122 0.141 0.000 0.039 0.080 0.151 1.430
 Italy 0.124 0.155 0.000 0.040 0.080 0.151 3.300
 Spain 0.186 0.217 -0.033 0.049 0.117 0.240 1.560
∆log St    
 Germany 0.021 0.158 -0.596 -0.058 0.021 0.107 0.828
 France 0.029 0.153 -1.780 -0.051 0.029 0.112 1.360
 Italy 0.034 0.196 -2.400 -0.060 0.035 0.131 3.000
 Spain 0.043 0.171 -0.660 -0.051 0.041 0.136 0.780
∆log Uct    
 Germany 0.025 0.110 -0.356 -0.044 0.025 0.091 0.422
 France -0.009 0.140 -0.339 -0.107 -0.014 0.089 0.362
 Italy -0.012 0.263 -2.100 -0.150 -0.008 0.126 1.700
 Spain 0.006 0.150 -0.380 -0.107 0.011 0.113 0.510
 CFt/Kt-1    
 Germany 0.276 0.464 -1.191 0.109 0.188 0.325 9.268
 France 0.330 0.330 -0.450 0.160 0.260 0.410 4.320
 Italy 0.196 0.220 -1.200 0.090 0.152 0.244 4.500
 Spain 0.370 0.469 -1.100 0.126 0.256 0.471 5.000
Log Uct    
 Germany -1.865 0.182 -2.572 -1.984 -1.859 -1.738 -1.126
 France -1.770 0.140 -2.260 -1.860 -1.770 -1.670 -1.270
 Italy -1.870 0.272 -3.500 -2.000 -1.860 -1.710 -0.900
 Spain -1.742 0.185 -3.351 -1.851 -1.736 -1.613 -0.984
  No. of obs. No. of 
firms
Years   
 Germany 40,362 5,876 1989-1997   
 France 61,237 6,946 1985-1999   
 Italy 94,523 8,019 1985-1999   
 Spain 19,025 2,034 1985-1999   
 
V. Regression results 
 
In this section we present regression results for the specifications reported in 
equations (8) and (9). We first present estimation results using the WITHIN estimator. We 
then present estimation results using the GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991).  
Table 2 reports the results obtained with the WITHIN estimator. We include a full 
set of time dummies. These will capture the effect of macro influences on firm-specific 
investment. We dropped the lagged dependent variable for two reasons. First, it is known 
that the WITHIN estimator is biased with certainty when lagged dependent variables are 
present (Nickell, 1981). This bias is due to the correlation of the transformed residual with 
the transformed lagged dependent variable. Second, in this way we can directly compare 
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our WITHIN estimation results with those obtained for US data by Chirinko, Fazzari and 
Meyer (1999) using a panel of 4,095 manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms from 
1981-91 representing 48 per cent of aggregate US non-residential investment in 1987. 
(See their Table 2, p. 62, for the WITHIN results.) 
 For all countries, sales have a substantial effect in the long run on the 
capital stock. We obtain long-term sales elasticities ranging from 0.407 in 
Germany to 0.228 in Italy. Also for all countries, the contemporaneous effect of 
sales is the largest, ranging from 0.126 in Germany to 0.075 in Italy. All lags of 
sales growth (up to t-3) have a significant effect on investment. This could be due 
to many different reasons, including installation lags or adjustment cost. Chirinko 
et al. (1999) found a rather similar long-run sales elasticity of 0.322 with a 
contemporaneous effect of 0.120 for the U.S. Note that our specification abstracts 
from possible irreversibility of investment. Under irreversibility the sales growth 
and the user cost growth could have a non linear effect on investment. For all 
countries except Spain, also the user cost has a significant effect on the capital 
stock in the long run. We obtain user cost elasticities ranging from –0.63 in 
Germany to –0.318 in Italy.15 Chirinko et al. (1999) found a long-run user cost 
elasticity of -0.721. In every country (including the U.S.), except for Spain, these 
long-term user cost elasticities are even higher than the long-term sales elasticities. 
Again, the contemporaneous effect is the largest and past user cost changes are 
generally significant. This provides evidence against simple sales-accelerator 
models that only include sales and exclude user costs. It is important to note that 
even for Spain, although the long-run user cost elasticity (UCE) is not significant, 
the contemporaneous user cost effect is clearly negative and significant. Moreover, 
in a more parsimonious specification, removing the insignificant lags, the point 
estimates of the remaining regressors do not significantly change and the long-run 
user cost elasticity is larger, in absolute value, and significant. 
Owing to simultaneity between investment and the user cost, the WITHIN 
estimates might be biased towards zero. This problem, of course, can be generalised to a 
potential simultaneity between all variables in the regression. 
 
                                                          
15
 The sign and dimension of these two effects are similar to those obtained using specifi-
cations with a different lag structure and are similar to those reported in the paper by Gaiotti and 
Generale (2001) that employ a data set that contains non-manufacturing Italian firms as well. 
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 Table 2: Models of Investment Demand – 3 lags WITHIN estimates, Dependent Variable: II,t/ 
KI,t-1 
Explanatory  
Variable 
GERMANY FRANCE ITALY SPAIN 
∆log SI,t 0.126 (0.008)**  0.107 (0.005)** 0.075 (0.004)** 0.080 (0.014)** 
∆log SI,t-1 0.121 (0.009)** 0.099 (0.005)** 0.072 (0.003)** 0.077 (0.013)** 
∆log SI,t-2 0.097 (0.097)** 0.059 (0.005)** 0.048 (0.004)** 0.042 (0.013)** 
∆log SI,t-3 0.064 (0.008)** 0.040 (0.005)** 0.031 (0.003)** 0.038 (0.012)** 
Long-term sales 
elasticity  
0.407 (0.022)** 0.305 (0.011)** 0.228 (0.010)** 0.237 (0.033)** 
∆log UCi,t -0.230 (0.013)** -0.211 (0.007)** -0.144 (0.003)** -0.187 (0.029)** 
∆log UCi,t-1 -0.213 (0.014)**  -0.110 (0.007)** -0.095 (0.003)** 0.024 (0.030) 
∆log UCi,t-2 -0.107 (0.013)**  -0.046 (0.007)** -0.052 (0.003)** 0.048 (0.030) 
∆log UCi,t-3 -0.080 (0.080)**  -0.015 (0.006)* -0.020 (0.002)** 0.023 (0.026) 
Long-term user 
cost elasticity 
-0.630 (0.022)**  -0.382 (0.013)** -0.318 (0.010)** -0.092 (0.064) 
No. of obs. 22,734 33,453 62,447 8,855 
No. of firms 5,876 6,946 8,019 2,034 
* Significant at the 5 per cent level. ** Significant at the 1 per cent level. Time dummies are included.  
 
Therefore, we also present the results using the GMM first difference estimator of 
Arellano-Bond (1991). This time we include the lagged dependent variable. We use as 
instruments the lagged variables used in the regression from t-2 onwards. The results are 
in Table 3. 
 For all countries, with the partial exception of Spain, the long-run sales elasticities 
are similar to the WITHIN results. The point estimates increase somewhat for Germany, 
France and Italy, and decrease for Spain, but the effect of sales on capital remains 
statistically significant. The effect of sales on investment is clearly a robust feature in 
every country. 
 What is striking, however, is how the point estimates of the long-run user cost 
elasticities change when moving to GMM. These differences are non-uniform across 
countries. The GMM results show a slightly higher point estimate of the long-run user 
cost elasticity for Germany (-0.663), a dramatically lower one for France (-0.106) and 
Italy (-0.111) and a dramatically higher one for Spain (-.259).  
So far, these are the results obtained by means of a common specification. Before 
proceeding it is worth mentioning some robustness checks made for each country. 
Comparison with other results is obtained either by running regressions with a slightly 
modified set of instruments (results not shown) or by taking stock of the results presented 
in the companion papers of the Monetary Transmission project.  
For Germany, the AR(2) statistics in the specification presented in Table 3 show 
that there might be an autocorrelation problem in the residuals. It is interesting to note 
that, using King-Fullerton user costs, von Kalckreuth (2001) obtains a smaller user cost 
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elasticity of 0.522 for the same model. For France, the significance level of the elasticity 
of I/K to the user cost turns out to be dependent on the choice of instruments. For Italy, a 
sensitivity analysis of the results obtained with this specification was conducted by trying 
different instrument sets. By using a more parsimonious set of instruments, excluding lags 
2 and 3 of the user cost, the long-run effect of the user cost is -.234, more similar to the 
outcome of the WITHIN regression. Moreover, the Sargan test accepts the set of 
instruments at a higher confidence level. The effect of sales is similar to the one observed 
in table 3. For Spain, the use of a more parsimonious specification leads again to more 
precise estimates. When removing insignificant lags, the point estimates of the remaining 
regressors do not significantly vary and the standard errors for the long-run elasticities are 
significantly lower. In particular, the point estimate for the long-run sales elasticity is 
0.098 with a standard error of 0.039, and the point estimate of the long-run user cost elas-
ticity is – 0.273 with a standard error of 0.131. 
 
 
Table 3: ADL Models of Investment Demand – 3 lags 
GMM estimates, Dependent Variable: Ii,t/ Ki,t-1 
Explanatory  
Variable 
GERMANY FRANCE ITALY SPAIN 
II,t-1/Ki,t-2 0.142 (0.017)** 0.024 (0.061) 0.176 (0.007)** 0.123 (0.019)** 
II,t-2/Ki,t-3 0.010 (0.009)  0.050 (0.011)* 0.022 (0.005)** -0.004 (0.014) 
II,t-3/Ki,t-4 0.008 (0.007) 0.029 (0.006)* 0.017 (0.005)** 0.001 (0.012) Σ Ii,t-n/Ki,t-n-1 0.160 (0.026)** 0.103 (0.031)* 0.215 (0.013)** 0.120 (0.035)**  
∆log Si,t 0.162 (0.053)**  0.073 (0.035)* 0.117 (0.032)* 0.038 (0.064) 
∆log Si,t-1 0.106 (0.013)**  0.086 (0.009)* 0.062 (0.040)** 0.041 (0.017)** 
∆log Si,t-2 0.069 (0.011)**  0.137 (0.008)* 0.033 (0.005)** 0.027 (0.014)* 
∆log Si,t-3 0.042 (0.010)**  0.014 (0.006)* 0.013 (0.005)** 0.018 (0.012) Σ ∆ log SI,t-n 0.379 (0.062)** 0.310 (0.024)* 0.224 (0.039)** 0.124(0.075)* 
Long-term sales 
elasticity  
0.452 (0.073)** 0.346 (0.036)* 0.286 (0.049)** 0.141 (0.085)* 
∆log UCi,t -0.286 (0.089)**  -0.055 (0.026)* -0.045 (0.016)** -0.274 (0.135)** 
∆log UCi,t-1 -0.170 (0.029)**  -0.045 (0.019)* -0.027 (0.008)** -0.003 (0.041)* 
∆log UCi,t-2 -0.072 (0.021)**  -0.002 (0.011) -0.011 (0.005)* 0.032 (0.035) 
∆log UCi,t-3 -0.029 (0.015)  0.007 (0.007) -0.004 (0.004) 0.017 (0.028) Σ ∆ log UCi,t-n -0.557 (0.134)** -0.095 (0.037)* -0.087 (0.030)** -0.228 (0.177) 
Long-term user 
cost elasticity  
-0.663 (0.167)** -0.106 (0.048)* -0.111 (0.039)** -0.259 (0.201) 
No. of obs. 16,858 33,453 62,447 8,855 
No. of firms 5,876 6,946 8,019 2,034 
Sargan-Hansen test 69.81 (p=0.29) 
 
105.12 (p=0.09) 
 
126.80 (p=0.09) 127.26 (p=0.09) 
AR(1) 13.74** -6.51 ** -30.90 ** -14.37** 
AR(2) -2.03 (p=0.04)* -2.17 (p=0.03)* 0.08 (p=0.99) -0.19 (p=0.85) 
Estimation method: 2-step GMM estimates, including time dummies  
* Significant at the 5 per cent level. ** Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
Instruments: Germany: lags 2 and earlier of I/K, ∆logS and ∆logUC; France: I/K lags 3 to 5; ∆logS lags 2 to 4 
and ∆logUC lags 2 to 5 ; Italy: I/K lags 2 to 6; ∆logS and ∆logUC lags 2 to 4.; Spain: lags 2 to 5 of I/K, ∆logS 
and ∆logUC.  
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It is important to investigate whether the sales and user cost elasticities are 
sensitive to adding cash flow to the regression. Since Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(1988) it is usual to enter cash flow in the regression to allow for liquidity constraints. The 
results estimated by GMM are presented in table 4. 
As is generally the case in the empirical literature, the cash flow capital ratio 
enters significantly and with a positive sign. The total effect of cash flow on I/K ranges 
from a low of 0.079 in Germany to a high of 0.301 in Italy. The higher coefficient with 
respect to those obtained in the other countries could indicate that firms’ balance-sheet 
conditions are relatively important in Italy.16 Also, the sales elasticity goes down 
substantively for all countries. Since cash flow might be a proxy for future profitability 
and future sales, this result was to be expected. Likewise, in the former regression, the 
sales variable might have picked up some effects that should really have been attributed to 
liquidity and profits. The long-run user cost elasticities are different with respect to the 
former GMM results. They are lower for Germany and Italy if for those countries we 
compare the results obtained using the same set of instruments; they are close to zero for 
France and turn out to be higher for Spain. 
The change in the long-run user cost elasticity when cash flow is entered into the 
regression can be explained by how the user cost was constructed. The average interest 
rate variable used for constructing the user cost of capital is interest payments divided by 
the amount of debt. This induces a correlation with cash flow, of which interest payments 
also are an important part.17 
Overall, the results in Tables 2, 3 and 4 suggest that sales, user cost and cash flow 
are all important determinants of investment. That user cost enters significantly in 
investment regressions is an important result, since it is the prerequisite for an interest-rate 
channel. The finding that (for most countries) the user cost elasticity varies substantially 
according to estimation method and specification is less satisfying. (Note that this is also 
the case for the U.S. in Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999).) However, given the 
difficulties encountered in the empirical literature for this kind of estimation, this is not 
                                                          
16
 On the other hand, as is well discussed by Bond et al. (1997), a positive effect of cash 
flow on investment does not necessarily reflect the presence of financial constraints. If higher cash 
flows are a good predictor of high activity in the future, it may very well be that a positive 
relationship between investment and cash flow does not reflect the existence of financial 
constraints. To partially address this criticism, the regression for Italy was re-run using liquidity 
stock as a measure of firms’ balance-sheet conditions. This variable should be less correlated with 
expectations of future demand conditions: results (not reported) indicate that liquidity, too, has a 
positive and significant effect on capital formation; in the regression the sign and significance of 
sales and the user cost remain unchanged. 
17 As noted by Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999) “in the regression without cash flow the 
estimated sum of coefficients of the user cost captures both the conventional substitution effect as 
well as the income effect induced by financing constraints, which affect investment in the same 
direction”. 
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too surprising. In addition one needs to cautiously interpret the user cost elasticities as 
stemming from pure interest rate effects. Since the firm specific user cost  could change 
with the firm’s risk premia changes over the cycle, part of the user cost change might 
reflect risk premia changes and hence be ascribed to a balance sheet channel. Adding 
additional collateral variables besides cash flow to the regression would potentially 
alleviate this problem. 
 
Table 4 : ADL Models of Investment Demand – 3 lags including cash flow 
GMM estimates, Dependent Variable: Ii,t/ KI,t-1 
Explanatory  
Variable 
GERMANY FRANCE ITALY SPAIN 
Ii,t-1/Ki,t-2 0.124 (0.017)** 0.086 (0.010)** 0.168 (0.011)** 0.120 (0.021)** 
Ii,t-2/Ki,t-3 0.002 (0.009) 0.016 (0.007)* 0.024 (0.006)** 0.007 (0.014) 
Ii,t-3/Ki,t-4 0.005 (0.007) 0.014 (0.006)* 0.018 (0.005)** 0.010 (0.012) Σ Ii,t-n/Ki,t-n-1 0.131 (0.026)** 0.116 (0.033)** 0.206 (0.016)** 0.137 (0.038)** 
∆log Si,t 0.142 (0.054)** 0.031 (0.040) 0.045 (0.033) -0.043 (0.063) 
∆log Si,t-1 0.097 (0.014)** 0.055 (0.009)** 0.039 (0.006)** 0.028 (0.018) 
∆log Si,t-2 0.061 (0.011)** 0.017 (0.007)* 0.018 (0.005)** 0.014 (0.014) 
∆log Si,t-3 0.036 (0.010)** 0.007 (0.005) 0.007 (0.004) 0.016 (0.013) Σ ∆ log Si,t-n 0.338 (0.068)** 0.110 (0.039)** 0.109 (0.040)** 0.015 (0.075) 
Long-term sales 
elasticity 
0.387 (0.077)** 0.124 (0.046)** 0.138 (0.050)** 0.018 (0.087) 
∆log UCi,t -0.220 (0.080)** 0.002 (0.030) -0.079 (0.021)** -0.279 (0.126)** 
∆log UCi,t-1 -0.151 (0.028)** -0.030 (0.03) -0.055 (0.017)** -0.018 (0.040) 
∆log UCi,t-2 -0.060 (0.020)** 0.002 (0.013) -0.021 (0.013) 0.036 (0.034) 
∆log UCi,t-3 -0.021 (0.015) 0.002 (0.007) -0.006 (0.005) 0.021 (0.027) Σ ∆ log UCi,t-n -0.452 (0.124)** -0.024 (0.032) -0.161 (0.048)** -0.240 (0.171) 
Long-term user 
cost elasticity  
-0.521 (0.148)** -0.027 (0.039) -0.204 (0.060)** -0.278 (0.198) 
CFi,t/Ki,t-1 0.043 (0.036) 0.056 (0.030)* 0.255 (0.035)** 0.121 (0.032)** 
CFi,t-1/Ki,t-2 0.011 (0.012) 0.091 (0.015)** -0.025 (0.019) 0.037 (0.022)* 
CFi,t-2/Ki,t-3 0.011 (0.006) 0.018 (0.007)** 0.008 (0.007) -0.019 (0.009)** 
CFi,t-3/Ki,t-4 0.004 (0.005) 0.008 (0.005) 0.000 (0.006) -0.006 (0.008) Σ CFI,t-n/Ki,t-n-1 0.069 (0.027)* 0.173 (0.030)** 0.238 (0.022)** 0.133(0.032)** 
Long-term cash 
flow sensitivity 
0.079 (0.031)* 0.196 (0.039)** 0.301 (0.028)** 0.153 (0.037)** 
No. of obs. 16,858 33,453 62,447 8,855 
No. of firms 5,876 6,946 8,019 2,034 
Sargan-Hansen test 91.80 (p=0.29) 133.40 (p=0.43) 127.20 (p=0.40) 149.81 (p=0.17) 
AR(1) 13.72**  -24.60** -30.10** -14.62** 
AR(2) 2.08 (p=0.04)* 1.21 (p=0.23) -0.18 (p=0.86) 0.13 (p= 0.90) 
Estimation method: 2-step GMM estimates, including time dummies  
* Significant at the 5 per cent level. ** Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
Instruments: Germany: lags 2 and earlier of all explanatory variables; France: lags 2 to 5 of I/K, CF/K and ∆log S, and lags 3 to 5 of ∆log UC; Spain: lags 2 to 5 of I/K, CF/K and ∆log UC, and lags 2 to 4 of ∆log S;  
Italy: I/K lags 2 to 6; ∆logS lags 2 to 4; ∆logUC lag 4; CF/K lags 2 to 5. 
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 VI. The broad credit channel in the euro area 
 
In this section we test whether small and large firms show different investment behaviour. 
We are especially interested in differences in the coefficient estimates of the cash flow 
capital ratio. By testing whether the long-run effect of the cash flow capital ratio is 
significantly different for small firms than for large firms, we are able to compare the 
behaviour of firms that are likely to be characterised by weaker balance sheets with that of 
other firms.  
It is well known that “models that incorporate financial frictions are more rele-
vant for certain types of agents, certain classes of borrowers, and certain sectors of the 
economy” (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 1995). Moreover, as these authors note: “because of 
the difficulties associated with formulating and estimating true structural models, empiri-
cal exercises seeking to establish the validity of either a credit channel or a financial ac-
celerator must make comparisons against benchmarks where such credit effects are less 
likely to be relevant”. 
Sample comparisons using size as a discriminating characteristic of the balance-
sheet conditions of firms are commonly used in the empirical literature that has examined 
the link between financial constraints and investment spending (see Schiantarelli, 1995 for 
a discussion). Smaller firms are more likely to be less collateralised, to be more opaque 
towards external investors and, insofar as age is correlated with small size, have less es-
tablished contacts with lenders, thus making it more difficult to distinguish between good 
and bad firms. Other characteristics that have been commonly used in these tests are divi-
dend payout behaviour, group membership, the nature of the bank-firm relationship, and 
the degree of ownership concentration. In particular circumstances and in some countries, 
these characteristics may very well be more important than size. In fact, as Schiantarelli 
(1995) notes, one problem with splitting the sample along one firm characteristic is that 
“[this] single indicator may or may not be a sufficient statistic for the existence of liquidity 
constraints”.  
Analysis of the institutional characteristics that in each country can blur the 
relevance of the size split is beyond the scope of this paper. In the companion papers that 
focus on single country evidence, other firm characteristics that might prove relevant for 
the transmission of monetary policy shocks via the balance sheet are analysed. (See, for 
example, Chatelain and Tiomo (2001) for France, von Kalckreuth (2001) for Germany, 
Valderrama (2001) for Austria, Butzen, Fuss and Vermeulen (2001) for Belgium and 
Gaiotti and Generale (2001) for Italy). We present here only the size split results since 
these are probably more easily comparable across countries.  
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Table 5 : Long-term elasticity of sales and user cost and long-term effect of cash flow on large 
and small firms. GMM ADL3 with CF 
 GERMANY FRANCE ITALY SPAIN 
∆log S large firms  0.337 (0.086)** 0.073 (0.032)* 0.108 (0.051)* 0.040 (0.012)** 
Diff. Small – Large  -0.029 (0.125) 0.042 (0.040) 0.027 (0.079)* -0.031 (0.021) 
∆log UCi, large firms -0.512 (0.173)** -0.053 (0.040) -0.238 (0.060)** -0.153 (0.082)* 
Diff. Small – Large 0.063 (0.255) 0.057 (0.180) 0.024 (0.098) 0.072 (0.167) 
CF/K large firms 0.092 (0.038)* 0.221(0.030)** 0.196 (0.027)** 0.116 (0.021)** 
Diff. Small – Large  -0.050 (0.050) -0.035 (0.031) 0.144 (0.045)** 0.030 (0.033) 
* Significant at the 5 per cent level. ** Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
 
Table 5 contains the regression results of equation (9) when allowing for different 
coefficients for user cost growth, sales growth and the cash flow capital ratio for large and 
small firms. With the exception of Italy, we find no systematic differences between large 
and small firms across countries. This is the case for both the sales and user cost 
elasticities and for the effect of cash flow. The point estimates of the differences in 
elasticities are non-systematically positive or negative and usually non-significant.  
For Italy, the sum of the cash flow coefficients for small firms is significantly 
higher than for large firms. The fact that balance-sheet conditions are more important for 
firms that are probably more exposed to problems of information asymmetries seems to 
confirm the existence of a broad credit channel in Italy. These results seem robust to dif-
ferent model specifications, such as the error-correction model estimated in Gaiotti and 
Generale (2001).  
 We think however that it would be too early to conclude that the broad credit 
channel is only operative in Italy. Clearly, more sophisticated sample splits might provide 
significant differences across firms belonging to different groups. The results in Table 5 
do indicate that identifying the broad credit channel by only taking into account the size 
classification might be an oversimplification in most euro-area countries. Size might not 
be a sufficient or even correct indicator for some countries of informational asymmetries 
that are the basis for broad credit channel effects.  
Indeed, as already noted above, the companion papers to this research project 
address the issue of heterogeneity across firms under many other different dimensions. For 
Germany, when firms’ ratings are used as a proxy of financial constraints, it turns out that 
those with a lower rating are more sensitive to financial variables (von Kalckreuth, 2001). 
For France, firms belonging to the equipment goods sector, firms with a lower rating and 
firms with a high share of trade credit in the balance sheet are also more sensitive to cash 
flow (Chatelain and Tiomo, 2001). In addition, for France, the introduction of dummy 
variables which isolate firms that are more sensitive to cash flow has the effect of shifting 
back the user cost elasticity to its level obtained without cash flow, i.e. a significant value 
below -0.1. For Italy, firms with a high share of intangible assets over total assets, an 
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indication of the extent of asymmetric information, respond more to variables that 
approximate their financial condition (Gaiotti and Generale, 2001). Moreover, results for 
other countries that we do not analyse by means of a common specification point to the 
presence of heterogeneity. For Austria, the existence of a “Hausbank” (main bank) signifi-
cantly affects the transmission of monetary impulses. Valderrama (2001) finds that firms 
having closer relationships with the main bank react less to cash flow and more to the user 
cost than firms with less “intense” relationships. In Luxembourg, younger firms seem 
more exposed to liquidity constraints, measured by means of various financial ratios 
(Lünnemann and Mathä, 2001). For Belgium, Butzen, Fuss and Vermeulen (2001) docu-
ment a high degree of heterogeneity in firms’ reaction to monetary policy depending on 
the sectors in which the firms operate. 
 
VII. User cost, cash flow, sales and monetary policy: a simulation exercise
18
 
 
In this section, we first analyse the dynamics of the regression equation. We then perform 
a more complicated simulation exercise to determine the elasticity of investment with 
respect to user cost, sales and cash flow. We finally determine the elasticity of investment 
with respect to the market interest rate.  
We use the point estimates of the coefficients as presented in table 4. In the 
following, we present the short run time profile of the investment ratio I/K in the presence 
of simple shocks to the explanatory variables and compare these profiles over the four 
European countries. 
Consider the following experiment. Imagine a firm for which user cost growth, 
sales growth, CF/K and I/K are all at their steady state path. Next, imagine one single 
shock at time t to user cost growth, e.g. user cost growth at time t is equal to its steady 
state path value plus 0.01, and that after time t user cost growth is again at its steady state 
path. What happens to I/K at time t, t+1, etc., assuming the paths of the other variables i.e. 
real sales growth and CF/K are held constant at their steady state path? A similar 
experiment can be performed for real sales growth (again holding the other variables at 
their steady state), or for CF/K.  
Note that one could object to this type of analysis on multiple grounds. First, user 
cost growth, sales growth and CF/K are all endogenous, implying that shocks to one 
variable might have immediate or lagged effects on the other variables. Basically, the 
regression equation is just one equation describing I/K. In reality, the behaviour of all 
                                                          
18 We want to thank Daniele Terlizzese for a patient and productive discussion of the issues 
involved.  
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relevant variables should be described with a multi-equation system. This, however, is 
outside the scope of this paper. Second, the regression equation contains the capital stock 
at both the left-hand side and right-hand side (I/K and CF/K). Since movements in I/K will 
ultimately move K, CF/K will also change (unless CF moves by the same amount as K). In 
this first exercise, we also abstract from this second objection (hence implicitly letting CF 
move at the same rate of K when holding CF/K constant.). 
Given the above two objections, we still believe the experiment to be of value. 
First, it provides a description of the dynamics of the equation concentrating on one 
variable at a time. Second, more complicated experiments in which shocks to certain 
variables coincide with (lagged) shocks to other variables are just linear combinations of 
the above simple experiments. For instance, if one considers a simultaneous shock to sales 
growth and CF/K, then one can simply add the effects on I/K.  
We consider two types of shocks for this experiment. We first consider a shock of 
1 per cent (i.e. the explanatory variable at time t has the value of its steady state plus 0.01). 
It is necessary to see that such a transitory shock to the growth rates of the user costs or 
sales corresponds to a permanent shock to the level of this variable. We next consider a 
shock which has a magnitude of one standard deviation of the within-firm variation of the 
variable. We find this last shock especially appealing because it represents a shock relative 
to the ‘normal’ variation present in the variable in our data. We indeed find that the 
within-firm variation of user cost growth, sales growth and CF/K is much larger than 1 per 
cent and differs substantially across variables and across countries. 
Tables 6.1-6.3 present the deviation of I/K from its steady state path after those 
two types of shocks, adopting as a benchmark the specification presented in Table 4. 
Table 6.1 shows the change in I/K after a 1 per cent (column 1) or one standard deviation 
shock (column 2) in user cost growth. Most of the effects take place within the first two 
years. A 1 per cent increase in user cost growth has the largest effect in Spain and 
Germany. Misleadingly, the magnitude of the effect seems small. However, in the data, a 
one standard deviation change in the user cost growth rate is much larger than 1 per cent; 
it is 10.6 per cent in Germany, 13.7 per cent in France, 26.1 per cent in Italy and 14.5 per 
cent in Spain. In the first period, a rise in the user cost growth in Germany of one standard 
deviation depresses I/K by 2.33 percentage points. Given the level of average gross 
investment per unit of capital of 0.181 in Germany, this translates into a drop to 0.1577 
(i.e. 0.181-0.0233). Similar larger effects can be observed in Italy and Spain. The 
comparison between columns 1 and 2 reveal some interesting features of the data and the 
regression result. We can interpret the regression equation as a description of investment 
behaviour in the period of investigation. Then it is clear that two distinct features have 
determined this behaviour: the magnitude of the reaction of the I/K ratio to shocks to the 
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explanatory variables, and the magnitude of those shocks. For instance, whereas the 
contemporaneous reaction to identical user cost growth shocks in Italy was much smaller 
than in Germany (as evidenced in column 1), Italian user cost growth shocks were on 
average much larger than German shocks. Combining those two features implies similar 
behaviour of the I/K ratio after a one standard deviation shock (as evidenced in column 2). 
Note that our regressions are conditional on the historical variation in the data. This 
historical variation could be quite different from future variation.  
 
Table 6.1. Change in I/K after a one-time 1 per cent or one standard deviation increase in the 
user cost growth at time t 
    
 Germany France  Italy Spain 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
    
T -0.22 -2.33 0.00 0.03 -0.08 -2.06 -0.28 -4.05 
t+1 -0.18 -1.88 -0.03 -0.41 -0.07 -1.78 -0.05 -0.75 
t+2 -0.08 -0.84 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.90 0.03 0.40 
t+3 -0.04 -0.38 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.39 0.02 0.31 
    
A 1 standard deviation increase in the user cost growth is equal to 0.106 in Germany, 0.137 in 
France, 0.261 in Italy and 0.145 in Spain. 
Figures in columns (1) and (2), respectively, represent the deviation of I/K in percentage points 
after a 1 per cent and one standard deviation increase in the user cost growth.  
 
Table 6.2 shows the change in I/K after both a 1 per cent (column 1) or one 
standard deviation shock (column 2) in sales growth. Again, the largest effects can be 
observed in the first two years. The sales effect is largest in Germany. A one standard 
deviation increase in the growth rate of sales increases the investment ratio I/K by 2.26 per 
cent in the same year.  
Table 6.3 shows the change in I/K after a 1 per cent (column 1) or one standard 
deviation shock (column 2) in the CF/K ratio. The contemporaneous effects are quite 
large. They are the smallest in Germany. Investment in Italian and Spanish firms, in 
particular, seems to move quite strongly simultaneously with CF/K movements.  
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 Table 6.2. Change in I/K after a one-time 1 per cent or one standard deviation increase in sales 
growth at time t 
    
 Germany France  Italy Spain 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
    
T 0.16 2.26 0.03 0.44 0.05 0.84 -0.04 -0.68 
t+1 0.12 1.77 0.06 0.81 0.05 0.87 0.02 0.36 
t+2 0.08 1.16 0.02 0.32 0.03 0.50 0.02 0.26 
t+3 0.04 0.59 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.25 0.02 0.28 
    
A 1 standard deviation increase in sales growth is equal 0.145 in Germany, 0.141 in France, 0.187 
in Italy and 0.159 in Spain.  
Figures in columns (1) and (2), respectively, represent the deviation of I/K in percentage points after 
a 1 per cent and one standard deviation increase in sales growth. 
 
Table 6.3. Change in I/K after a one-time 1 per cent or one standard deviation increase in 
CF/K at time t 
    
 Germany France  Italy Spain 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
    
T 0.04 1.28 0.06 1.29 0.26 3.90 0.12 3.74 
t+1 0.02 0.47 0.10 2.21 0.02 0.27 0.05 1.59 
t+2 0.01 0.40 0.03 0.63 0.02 0.26 -0.01 -0.37 
t+3 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.12 -0.01 -0.18 
    
A 1 standard deviation increase in the cash flow capital ratio is equal to 0.305 in Germany, 0.231 in 
France, 0.153 in Italy and 0.309 in Spain.  
Figures in columns (1) and (2), respectively, represent the deviation of I/K in percentage points after 
a 1 per cent and one standard deviation increase in the cash flow capital ratio. 
 
The regression equation ‘explains’ I/K in terms of user cost growth, sales growth 
and the CF/K ratio. However, the reader might find it more natural to think of the level of 
investment in terms of the level of user cost, sales or cash flow. After some algebra, the 
regression equation can also be used to calculate the elasticity of investment (I) with 
respect to the user cost, sales or cash flow. For example, by the elasticity of investment 
with respect to the user cost, we mean the percentage change of investment (i.e. I, not I/K) 
due to a ‘permanent’ 1 per cent change (from the base path) in the user cost level. The 
wording ‘permanent’ is important here. As in the first set of simulations given by the 
tables 6.1-6.3, a permanent change in the user cost level (from the base path) is given by a 
one-time 1 per cent change in the growth rate (from the base path) of user costs (see 
appendix). 
Tables 7.1-7.3 provide the elasticity of investment with respect to (the levels of) 
user cost, sales and cash flow. A substantive elasticity of investment with respect to its 
user cost is a necessary condition for an interest channel to be operative. As evidenced in 
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Table 7.1, the elasticity of contemporaneous investment with respect to the user cost is 
quite large in Germany (-1.21), Italy (-0.63) and Spain (-1.49). It is negligible in France 
(0.02), but becomes non-negligible in the year after (-0.24). The elasticity at time t+1 
remains substantive in Germany, Italy and Spain, but is smaller. Overall, table 7.1 
provides evidence of a strong and rapid reaction of investment to user cost changes. 
 
Table 7.1. Elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost  
  
 Germany France  Italy Spain 
  
T -1.21 0.02 -0.63 -1.49 
T+1 -1.17 -0.24 -0.59 -0.48 
T+2 -0.79 -0.03 -0.36 -0.05 
T+3 -0.61 0.00 -0.21 -0.06 
 
Table 7.2 presents the elasticity of investment with respect to sales. The contemporaneous 
elasticities are 0.86 for Germany, 0.25 for France, 0.36 for Italy and -0.23 for Spain. 
Surprisingly in Germany, Italy and Spain, investment seems to have a lower 
contemporaneous elasticity with respect to sales than with respect to its user cost. Given 
the emphasis on the sales accelerator model and the general ignoring of user cost in the 
investment literature, this is a provocative result. Although sales growth does undeniably 
have a positive effect on investment, one should not ignore user costs. 
 
Table 7.2. Elasticity of investment with respect to sales  
  
 Germany France  Italy Spain 
  
T 0.86 0.25 0.36 -0.23 
T+1 0.82 0.50 0.40 0.09 
T+2 0.69 0.25 0.27 0.08 
T+3 0.54 0.15 0.17 0.10 
 
Table 7.3 provides the elasticity of investment with respect to cash flow. Due to the past 
CF/K ratios in the regression, the effect of a permanent increase in cash flow gradually 
evolves and accumulates over time. The picture that emerges is mixed. In Germany and 
France the elasticity is generally lower than the sales elasticity. In Italy and Spain it is 
generally higher. 
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 Table 7.3. Elasticity of investment with respect to CF 
  
 Germany France  Italy Spain 
  
T 0.06 0.15 0.40 0.24 
T+1 0.10 0.42 0.46 0.38 
T+2 0.13 0.54 0.52 0.39 
T+3 0.16 0.60 0.55 0.42 
 
To understand the effect of monetary policy on investment Tables 7.1-7.3 are not 
sufficient. A relevant question is: ‘How do market interest rates affect user costs and cash 
flow in those four euro-area countries’?19 Essentially, the interest channel or ‘cash flow 
channel’ works through two stages. In the first stage, the market interest rate has to change 
firm fundamentals (user cost, and cash flow). In the second stage, these firm fundamentals 
have an effect on investment with the elasticities as presented in tables 7.1-7.3. Below we 
present some evidence on the first stage and show how, combined with the second stage, 
the channels of monetary policy differ across countries. 
We first investigate the effect of market interest rate changes on the user cost. The 
first important fact that should be noted is that interest rates form a part of the user cost of 
capital. The importance or weight of this part depends on the importance of the other parts 
such as depreciation and relative price changes. Since the user cost directly contains an 
interest rate in its definition, the elasticity of the user cost with respect to the interest rate 
can therefore be calculated directly. It is equal to: 
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The elasticity is simply the weight of the interest rate in the user cost definition. 
Hence, if depreciation or changes in relative prices are large, interest changes will have a 
small effect on the user cost. Table 8 shows the relative importance of the interest rate in 
the user cost definition in the different countries for an average firm in the data set. It is 
relatively high in Spain and Italy, somewhat lower in France and lowest in Germany. 
                                                          
19 Another relevant question is: ‘How do market interest rates affect sales?’ We do not attempt to 
answer that question. Interest-rate shocks do not have a ‘mechanical’ effect on sales in the same 
way as interest-rate shocks have on user cost and cash flow (interest rates are part of user costs, and 
interest payments are part of cash flow). Although interest rates can influence firm-specific demand 
(e.g., for investment goods or durable consumer goods producing firms), this demand effect is 
much more difficult to quantify. Trying to do this here would require a whole new paper.  
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Therefore, market interest rate changes will have larger effects on user cost in Italy and 
Spain than in France and Germany.  
 
Table 8 : Important elasticities 
 
 Germany  France Italy Spain  
(1) 
uc
i
i
uc
*∂∂  0.32 0.58 0.70 0.65 
(2)
CF
i
i
CF
*∂∂  -0.32 -0.28 -0.60 -0.47 
 
We now consider the effect of a permanent 1 per cent change in the market 
interest rate through the user cost. Note that by this we mean, for example, a change in the 
interest rate from 5 per cent to 5.05 per cent, not from 5 per cent to 6 per cent. Table 8 
shows us how much the user cost will change permanently. So, for instance, a 1 per cent 
permanent increase in the market interest rate leads to a user cost change of 0.32 per cent 
in Germany and 0.70 per cent in Italy. Combining this with the results of table 7.1 gives us 
the dynamic effects on investment of a 1 per cent change in the market interest rate. The 
results are presented in table 9. 
We find relatively large effects in Germany, Italy and Spain. If one were to 
consider, e.g., a 50 basis points increase in a market interest rate from 5 per cent to 5.50 
per cent, one would have to multiply the numbers in table 9 by 10. Such a policy 
experiment would lead to contemporaneous 3.9 per cent decrease in investment in 
Germany, 4.5 per cent in Italy, 9.8 per cent in Spain and no effect in France.  
 
 
Table 9. Elasticity of investment with respect to the market interest rate through the user cost 
     
 Germany France  Italy Spain 
  
T -0.39 0.01 -0.44 -0.97 
T+1 -0.38 -0.14 -0.41 -0.31 
T+2 -0.25 -0.02 -0.25 -0.04 
T+3 -0.19 0.00 -0.15 -0.04 
 
We also investigate the effect of a permanent change in the market interest rate on 
cash flow. Since interest payments are a flow, they decrease cash flow. When firms have 
higher interest payments to make, they have lower cash flow, ceteris paribus. The 
elasticity of cash flow with respect to the interest rate can also be calculated directly. It is 
equal to: 
 ( )( )( )1,1,1,1,11 1 1* −−−−−− −−− −−=∂∂ titititittt t DiCostspY DiCFiiCF τ τ  , 
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 The elasticity is equal to the inverse coverage ratio, i.e. interest payments over 
cash flow. The higher the inverse coverage ratio is, the higher the effect of interest pay-
ments will be on cash flow. Table 8 shows the elasticity of cash flow with respect to the 
market interest rate for the average firm in the samples. Italy and Spain again display 
higher values for this elasticity. Presumably this is due to high nominal interest rates for 
both countries during the years of investigation. Also, the term structure of debt of the 
firms has played a role. In Italy, e.g. firms historically were financed with expensive short-
term debt. In the future, given the unified interest rates, this might possibly change dra-
matically.  
Table 10 presents the effect on the growth rate of the capital stock (or investment) 
of a transitory increase of 1 per cent of the interest rate through the effect on cash flow. 
The effects are in general relatively small in all countries. Consider again a 50-basis point 
increase in a market interest rate from 5 per cent to 5.50 per cent. Such a policy 
experiment would lead, after the first year, to a contemporaneous 0.2 per cent decrease in 
investment in Germany, 0.4 per cent in France, 2.4 per cent in Italy and 1.1 per cent in 
Spain. 
 
Table 10. Elasticity of investment with respect to the market interest rate through cash flow 
     
 Germany France  Italy Spain 
  
T -0.02 -0.04 -0.24 -0.11 
T+1 -0.03 -0.12 -0.28 -0.18 
T+2 -0.04 -0.15 -0.31 -0.18 
T+3 -0.05 -0.17 -0.33 -0.20 
 
VIII. Conclusion  
  
This paper presents a comparable set of results on the monetary transmission 
channels on firm investment for the four largest countries of the euro area. We focus on 
two different channels that affect investment. The interest channel is operative when 
market interest fluctuations change the user cost of capital and hence investment. The 
broad credit channel is operative when market interest fluctuations change the balance-
sheet condition and the available cash flow of firms and, through this, investment. This 
paper is the first to provide an investigation of those two channels for the four largest 
economies of the euro area, based on results from a unique comparative study using large 
firm databases for each country, containing a total of over 215,000 observations from 
1985 to 1999. Its emphasis on using large micro-datasets makes this exercise an important 
complement to the vast macro-literature in which euro-area countries are compared. 
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We find investment to be sensitive to user cost changes in all those four countries. 
Most of the effect of user cost changes is borne within the first two years. This implies an 
operative interest channel in these euro-area countries. We also find investment in all 
those countries to be quite sensitive to sales and cash flow movements. Furthermore, we 
have investigated whether significant differences exist between large and small firms in 
investment behaviour. We find that only in Italy do smaller firms react more to cash flow 
movements. We argue that size might not be the right indicator in all countries to 
investigate the broad credit channel. 
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APPENDIX 
 
In this appendix we explain the calculation of the elasticity of investment with respect to 
user cost, sales and cash flow, based on an idea developed by Daniele Terlizzese. Start 
from the estimated equation (where we have dropped the subscripts i):  
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and the capital accumulation equation, ttt IKK +−= −1)1( δ . Let us define 
δ−≡−≡ −− − 11 1 ttt ttt KIK KKg . Then we can rewrite the estimated equation as: 
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Let us now consider, starting in period t, a shock to tuc∆  of 1 per cent (0.01), define  
as the corresponding new value of  and define  as the corresponding new value of 
.  
s
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Let us also define τ
τττη + +++ −≡ t tstt K KK . Some algebra shows that: 
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It is immediately clear that , and after some algebra we see that: 01.0*0σ−=− tst gg
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and so on. Given a baseline path for CF/K and g, these equations allow us to recursively 
compute all values of τη +t . The elasticity of the capital stock is then given by 100* τη +t . 
The elasticity of investment can be easily extracted from that of capital. If we define 
τ
τττη + +++ −≡ t tsttI I II , then, using the capital accumulation equation, we come up with 
t
t
tt
I
I
Kηη =  for period t , and τττττττ ηδηη + −+−+++++ −−= tttttttI IKIK 11)1(  for all later 
periods. To use these equations we need the baseline paths for 
t
t
I
K
, and τ
τ
+
−+
t
t
I
K 1  as well as 
the values of the depreciation rate. To keep the calculations as simple as possible we have 
assumed all these variables to be constant. To recover δ, we have used the following 
identity g
K
I
t
t −−1=δ  where g is assumed to be equal to the average growth of sales in 
each country; given δ we then have: 1)1( 1 +−= −
t
t
t
t
I
K
I
K δ . 
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We have also used the baseline path of CF/K to be the sample average of this variable in 
each country. Consider now a 1 per cent shock to cash flow. In period t we will have: 
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where c =CF/K. In period t+1 it will be: 
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and so on. We assume that c remains constant in the baseline path. 
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